Temat: voting power - Prolib Integro

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: The Conception of Blocking Power as a Key to the Understanding of the History of Designing Voting Systems for the EU Council
Autorzy:: Sozański, Tadeusz
Tematy:: voting game EU Council
voting power, blocking coalition
blocking power
EU Council; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/494257.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Unlike the classical approach to voting power, the approach presented in this paper makes a distinction between a voter's winning and blocking power and relates the latter kind of power to the number of small-size minimal blocking coalitions the voter can form with other voters. It is shown that the concept of blocking sheds light on the designing of voting systems for EU Council of Ministers from the very beginning to the Lisbon treaty
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Measuring a Collectivity’s Power to Act in Proper, Simple Voting Games : Why We Should Resist the Readiness to Use the Coleman Index
Autorzy:: Kleinowski, Marcin
Tematy:: the power of a collectivity to act
voting power
power of a voting body
power indices; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2044031.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: James S. Coleman proposed the power of a collectivity to act as a measure of the ease with which the individual interests of one member can be transformed into the collective action of a voting body, or into decisions being undertaken by that body which go against the interests of the voters. It was also to be applied in simple voting games, for which the vote threshold was set at a lower level than the majority of votes. Coleman based his model for determining the power of a collectivity to act on the classical definition of probability. In practice, the index is calculated as a quotient of the number of winning coalitions and of all possible coalitions which can be formed by the players – under the existing voting rule. The central hypothesis of the article has as its premise that in proper, simple nperson voting games the Coleman index does not determine passage probability, but only the probability of drawing a winning coalition from the set of all possible combinations of members of the voting body. A new index has also been proposed which should serve to determine a collectivity’s power to act.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Explaining China’s Behavior in Keystone International Financial Institutions: Learning, Adaptation and Reshaping?
Autorzy:: Xiaochen, Hou
Tematy:: China, international financial institutions, reform, voting power, decision-making; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Fundacja Instytut Nauki o Polityce
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/531267.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Over the last three decades, China’s participation in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the IMF has gone through three stages of: initial participation; steady development; and partnership . Over this time China has definitely became more engaged in the international financial institutions; become a great player in international affairs, and changed its role from recipient to contributor; from receiving technical assistance to sharing experience; from borrowing loans to being co-lender;. Why China has changed its attitude and behavior towards the World Bank and the IMF and will China effectively influence reconstruction of the international financial system? This paper explores to answer these questions from the perspective of three international relations theories of: structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. There will be three hypotheses tested in the process, which cover the whole process of China’s engagement in theinternational financial institution over more than 30 years. Thre will be two case studies conduceted to this end, the first of which regards China’s protest against the 2007 IMF surveillance. The second case is about votingpower reform of the IMF and the World Bank, which attracted attention around the globe. The overview of China’s engagement in the two organizations and the two cases shall fully test the three hypotheses. This paper argues that in the initial period, neoliberal institutionalism can better explain the interaction between China and the World Bank, and the IMF. In the last century, China’s proactive behavior can be better explained from structural realist and constructivist positions, focusing on China’s rising economic power, and redefined identity and interest. Nonetheless China will remain within the system, and will not attempt to to overthrow it. In the meantime, China will probably contribute to constructing other institutions to push for the reform of international financial institutions more effectively.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Average weights and power in weighted voting games
Autorzy:: Kirsch, Werner
Słomczyński, Wojciech
Życzkowski, Karol
Boratyn, Daria
Stolicki, Dariusz
Opis:: We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the $k$-th largest player under the uniform distribution. We analyze the average voting power of the $k$-th largest player and its dependence on the quota, obtaining analytical and numerical results for small values of $n$ and a general theorem about the functional form of the relation between the average Penrose-Banzhaf power index and the quota for the uniform measure on the simplex. We also analyze the power of a collectivity to act (Coleman efficiency index) of random weighted voting games, obtaining analytical upper bounds therefor.
Dostawca treści:: Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: Proximity in Coalition Building
Autorzy:: Reynaud, Julien
Lange, Fabien
Gątarek, Łukasz T.
Thimann, Christian
Tematy:: voting power index
coalition building
International Monetary Fund
linkage
proximity; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/483361.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together. Using this proximity index, we introduce a notion of relative linkages among coalition participants as determinant of coalition building. We propose an application to the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund, with linkages being represented by bilateral volumes of trade between voters. The results are able to explain several important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and may be useful for other applications in international politics.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 6.

Tytuł:: Propozycje modyfikacji mechanizmu wyznaczania kwot krajów członkowskich Międzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego
How to Modify the Mechanism for Setting Member State Quotas Within the International Monetary Fund
Autorzy:: Jurek, Michał
Tematy:: International Monetary Fund (IMF)
quotas
voting power
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs); Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie. Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/575499.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: The author proposes a series of changes that he says should be made to the rules for setting member state quotas and voting power in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper opens with a description of the current mechanism for setting member state quotas and voting power. Under the current system, a member’s quota in the IMFdetermines the amount of its subscription, its voting weight, its access to IMF financing, and its allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The United States has exclusive veto power. A member state cannot unilaterally increase its quota-increases must be approved by the Executive Board and are linked to formulas that include many variables such as the size of a country in the world economy. The author comes up with a proposal on how this mechanism could be modified. He provides an evaluation of how the suggested changes would impact the voting power of both developed and developing countries. On April 28, 2008, the IMF Board of Governors approved a reform of the institution’s governance. The reform was intended to modify the quota and voting share structure in order to enhance the participation and voice of emerging-market and developing countries, and realign members’ shares with their relative weight and role in the global economy. According to Jurek, while these modifications have increased the transparency of the process during which member country quotas are calculated, they have changed little when it comes to the voting power of developing and developed states. In particular, the new rules preserve the right of veto enjoyed by the United States, Jurek notes, a privilege that the U.S. has used on a number of occasions to block reforms designed to weaken its own position within the IMF.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 7.

Tytuł:: Elephant in the Room: How to Assess the Vote-weighting System in the Council of the EU
Autorzy:: Kleinowski, Marcin
Tematy:: voting power
Council of the European Union
EU institutional reform
QMV
weighted voting
power indices
blocking coalition; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. Wydawnictwo UMK
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/59149171.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: The article emphasises the complementarity of research based on voting power theory with the analysis of the structure of blocking. Combining both methods enables a more comprehensive assessment of the vote weighting system in the Council of the EU, in particular the impact of changes in the voting system on the position of individual Member States and the power balance in this institution. I make two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, the study develops a non-random voting model, dedicated to QMV in the Council, which abandons the assumption that each coalition of players is equally likely and takes into account the role of the European Commission as an agenda-setter. This not only allows us to exclude many coalitions that are only theoretically possible, but also to analyse the blocking structure from the perspective of different states or coalitions in the Council. Secondly, it shows that the application of blocking structure analysis provides novel insights into the Council’s voting system. Unlike the a priori voting power approach, such analysis does not focus on distribution of winning power in the Council, but on the Member States’ ability to build minimal blocking coalitions. Hence, it complements the application of mathematical indices of voting power in the assessment of the voting system in this institution.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 8.

Tytuł:: National and ideological influence in the European Parliament
Autorzy:: Turnovec, F.
Mercik, J. W.
Mazurkiewicz, M.
Tematy:: a priori voting power
European Parliament
European political parties
power indices
Shapley-Shubik power index; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970600.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In this paper we address the following question: Taking as decisional units national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of "national" coordination of voting and in the case of "partisan" coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step there is an internal voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there is a voting of aggregated groups (European political parties or national representations) in the EP. In both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary unit is a party group), difference is only in dimension of aggregation (European parties versus national representations). Power indices methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups in the cases of partisan and national coordination of voting behaviour.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 9.

Tytuł:: A randomized algorithm for computing the Shapley–Shubik index of power
Probabilistyczny algorytm obliczania indeksu Shapleya-Shubika
Autorzy:: Dulny, Andrzej
Opis:: The aim of the thesis is to discuss the computability of the Shapley–Shubik index of power. The index is used in game theory as a possible solution of cooperative games as well as in social choice theory as a measurement of voting power in yes/no voting systems. The problem of computing the Shapley–Shubik index of a given voting system is a NP-hard problem. In this paper a short outline of yes/no voting systems and a definition of the Shapley–Shubik index of power is presented. Since the index cannot be computed efficiently, an approximation algorithm of polynomial complexity is presented.
Praca poświęcona jest analizie obliczalności indeksu Shapleya-Shubika. Indeks ten stosowany jest w teorii gier koalicyjnych jako możliwe rozwiązanie takich gier ze względu na podział wygranej, jak i w teorii matematyki wyborczej, jako miara siły głosu w systemach typu tak/nie. Problemem związanym z jego zastosowaniem w praktyce jest jego trudna obliczalność w sensie algorytmicznym. Znajdowanie indeksu Shapleya-Shubika jest w rzeczywistości problemem NP-trudnym. W pracy zostanie pokrótce przedstawiona definicja tego indeksu i opisany algorytm przybliżonego jego obliczania w czasie wielomianowym.
Dostawca treści:: Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

Inne

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Skocz do pozycji: 10.

Tytuł:: The impact of Brexit on the voting power in the Council of the European Union
Autorzy:: Marcin, Kleinowski,
Tematy:: voting power
Brexit
Council of the European Union
siła głosu
Rada Unii Europejskiej; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/894873.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Artykuł analizuje potencjalny wpływ Brexitu na siłę głosu państw członkowskich oraz pośrednią siłę głosu rezydentów w Radzie, w przypadku przyjmowania decyzji kwalifikowaną większością głosów. Hipoteza główna zakłada, że wystąpienie Wielkiej Brytanii z Unii Europejskiej doprowadzi do kolejnego transferu siły głosu na korzyść pięciu państw o największej populacji. Celem artykułu jest również określenie w jakim stopniu pośrednia siła głosu rezydentów z poszczególnych państw członkowskich jest równa. Uzyskane rezultaty wskazują, że konsekwencją Brexitu będzie przepływ siły głosu w stronę pięciu państw Unii Europejskiej o największej populacji.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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