Temat: Swinburne - Prolib Integro

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection
Autorzy:: Olson, Eric T.
Tematy:: Swinburne
personal identity
immortality; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791263.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: The Revival of Substance Dualism
Autorzy:: Robinson, Howard
Tematy:: Swinburne
dualism
personal identity
epiphenomenalism; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791257.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls?
Autorzy:: Hasker, William
Tematy:: Swinburne
dualism
emergence
soul
thisness; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791260.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Richard Swinburne’s Are We Bodies or Souls? presents a sustained case for a view concerning the nature of persons that can be classified as a form of either Cartesian dualism or emergent dualism. This paper comments on two important arguments developed in the book and concludes by considering the problem of the origin of souls.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism vs Thomistic Hylomorphism
Autorzy:: Skrzypek, Jeremy W.
Tematy:: substance dualism
hylomorphism
Swinburne
Aquinas; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791264.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne presents an updated formulation and defense of his dualist theory of the human person. On this theory, human persons are compound substances, composed of both bodies and souls. The soul is the only essential component of the human person, however, and so each of us could, in principle, continue to exist without our bodies, composed of nothing more than our souls. As Swinburne himself points out, his theory of the human person shares many similarities with the hylomorphic theory of the human person espoused by Thomas Aquinas. Swinburne suggests at one point that the differences between the two theories are “almost entirely terminological,” pertaining chiefly to how each understands the term ‘substance’. In this essay, I aim to show that the differences between Swinburne’s Cartesian substance dualism and Thomistic hylomorphism are much more significant than that. I argue, moreover, that the distinctive claims of Thomistic hylomorphism allow it to successfully avoid some key concerns for Swinburne’s view.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity
Autorzy:: Schwenkler, John
Tematy:: Swinburne
dualism
personal identity
imaginary cases; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791259.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalyzable.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 6.

Tytuł:: Between blasphemy and desire for the sacred. Modernist litanies à rebours
Autorzy:: Majewska, Joanna
Tematy:: Baudelaire
Huysmans
Dubus
Swinburne
modernism
litany
blasphemy
Satan
God; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/703058.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In the second half of the 19th century in the European culture appears an increased interest in evil. This phenomenon is widely spread particularly in France and England. In his famous volume of poems Les Fleurs du Mal Charles Baudelaire publishes The Litanies for Satan where the Devil replaces God as the addressee of a blasphemous prayer. Joris-Karl Huysmans, an author of the novel Là-bas, describes a black mess and a litany addressed to Satan who seems to be closer to sinful people than perfectly indifferent God. A poet from the Huysmans’ artictic circle, Édouard Dubus, devotes his litany to a „Lady of grace and immorality” – a blasphemous double of Mary, mother of Jesus. An English poet Charles Algernon Swinburne writes Dolores, a poem addressed to „Our Lady of Pain” and recognised as the apogee of the satanic litany. In all these cases the choice of a litany as a literary genre results in acceptance of a vision of the world broaden with spirituality. In spite of their seemingly blasphemous plots, all these texts express a deep hunger for the sacred – the hunger that could not be satisfied with official religion.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 7.

Tytuł:: Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity
Autorzy:: Snowdon, Paul
Tematy:: Swinburne
physicalism
entailments
privileged access
personal identity
Simple View
Reductionist View; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791255.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical does in fact permit privileged access. In chapter 3 Swinburne defends the Simple View of personal identity. The reasoning is very complex and rich, but it is proposed that Swinburne has not really shown that a reductionist account cannot be correct.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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