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Tytuł:
Some problems with the Russellian open future
Autorzy:
Wawer, Jacek
Opis:
In a recently published paper, Todd (Mind, 125(499), pp. 775-798, 2016a) advocates a novel treatment of future contingents. On his view, all statements concerning the contingent future are false. He motivates his semantic postulates by considerations in philosophy of time and modality, in particular by the claim that there is no actual future. I present a number of highly controversial consequences of Todd’s theory. Inadequacy of his semantics might indirectly serve as an argument against the philosophical view underpinning his proposal.
Dostawca treści:
Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem prawdy u Wilhelma z Owernii
The problem of truth according to William of Auvergne
Autorzy:
Pawlikowski, Tomasz
Tematy:
Medieval Philosophy
Truth
Future Contingents
Metaphysics
Logic
Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:
Towarzystwo Naukowe Franciszka Salezego
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/496287.pdf  Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:
William of Auvergne (1180–1249) was one of the first wave professors of University in Paris to engage with Greek, Islamic and Jewish philosophical writings that had become available in Latin translation. He was the author of a vast work that he calls the Magisterium divinale (Teaching on God). De universo (On the Universe), written in the 1230s, is the most philosophical treatise of the Magisterium. One short part (I, 3, 25-26) of this treatise includes a very important philosophical topic – the problem of truth. Based on a doctrine of Avicenna, William formulated one of the forms of truth's classical definition. In his view, this definition express the essence of logical truth, which is constituted in any relation between human intellect and things, if intellect is adequate to his object. So the logical truth is a basis and property of true judgments and statements about all real things, and even about what really does not exist (things in the future, in the past, non-beings, negations), and – generally – about all the man can think or about everything possible to thinking. William rejects the doctrine of St. Augustine, who taught that every truth has its source in the First Truth identified with God the Creator of all things and intellects contingent. William argues that only actually existing things are real existing as caused by God. So only actually existing things can be substrates of truth and so subjects of true judgments and statements. The Creator doesn't cause things as existing in the past, in the future, but as existing in the present. What is more, He doesn't cause non-beings and negations. In consequence, William recognizes logical truth as the only justification for true adjudication of all what exists and doesn't exist. In Steven P. Marrone's opinion William's theory of truth is a new idea in the early thirteenth century. He believes that William's theory, however incomplete, explains how much the problem of truth is depended on logic rather than metaphysics, so that it could be separated radically from questions of being and viewed independently of the issue concerning the relation of the mind and creatures to God. In fact, although William continued to speak in traditional terms, he divorced with the point of view of ontology and natural theology, finding solutions in theories of logic and language. However, taken in this article studies seem to show that William's theory of truth is embedded in a metaphysical context. Furthermore, medieval logic is the science of the action of the intellect, which is a faculty of human being. This is not logic in twentieth-century's sense. Thus, it does not seem to William resigned from metaphysics to logic. His theory of logical truth is imperfect because of metaphysical errors. The main error is that the logical truth, which realizes in the relation of intellect to things and so is one of truths that exist in contingent beings, William considered as final and the sole basis of every true judgments and statements, without regard to its dependence on the First Truth. Indeed, logical truth is not able to truly independent existence.
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Back to the actual future
Autorzy:
Malpass, Alex
Wawer, Jacek
Opis:
The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor - the so-called Thin Red Line - which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics.
Dostawca treści:
Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tensed metaphysics and non-local grounding of truth
Autorzy:
Wawer, Jacek
Opis:
It is argued that the assignment of truth values to future contingents is threatened not by a tensed metaphysics but by a temporally "local" notion of truth, i.e., by the assumption that whatever is true at a given time needs to be grounded in what exists at that time. If this assumption is accepted, tensed and tenseless metaphysics are equally vulnerable; if it is rejected, both can accommodate true future contingents. This means that semantic decisions are largely independent of metaphysical considerations. The work of Correia and Rosenkranz (2018) is a clear example of how the tensed metaphysics of the growing block can incorporate true future contingents. Two potential worries are discussed in the context of their work: (a) that their grounding strategy overgeneralizes and admits true counterfactual contingents; and (b) that the growing block theory lacks sufficient resources to distinguish the unique possible future course of events that is relevant for the grounding of future contingents.
Dostawca treści:
Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A future for the thin red line
Autorzy:
Malpass, Alex
Wawer, Jacek
Opis:
The thin red line (TRL) is a theory about the semantics of future-contingents. The central idea is that there is such a thing as the ‘actual future’, even in the presence of indeterminism. It is inspired by a famous solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge associated with William of Ockham, in which the freedom of agents is argued to be compatible with God’s omniscience. In the modern branching time setting, the theory of the TRL is widely regarded to suffer from several fundamental problems. In this paper we propose several new TRL semantics, each with differing degrees of success. This leads up to our final semantics, which is a cross between the TRL and supervaluationism. We discuss the notions of truth, validity and semantic consequence which result from our final semantics, and demonstrate some of its pleasing results. This account, we believe, answers themain objection in the literature, and thus places the TRL on the same level as any other competing semantics for future contingents.
Dostawca treści:
Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Assensum in mente prophetae: William of Ockham and Walter Chatton on Prophecies
Autorzy:
Limonta, Roberto
Fedriga, Riccardo
Tematy:
Chatton
Ockham
Prophecies
Externalism
Internalism
Future Contingents
Assensum
Divine Foreknowledge
Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Szczeciński. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1621435.pdf  Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:
The subject of this article is the intertwining between Walter Chatton and William of Ockham’s theories about the cognitive nature of prophetic statements, a topic in the theological debate of the early 14th century. Starting from recent interpretations of Chatton and Ockham’s cognitive theory in terms of the distinction between externalism and internalism, and from a reading of some sources where the topic of prophecy is crucial (for Chatton: Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 38-39, the less investigated d. 41 and Quodlibeta, qq. 26-29; for Ockham: Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, q.1 and Quodlibeta, q. 4) we apply the externalism/internalism distinction to the case study of prophetic statements. Starting from epistemological questions about prophecies, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, we’ll show the outcomes as pragmatic rules of this kind of statements in both conceptual frameworks analyzed.
Tema dell'articolo è il rapporto tra Walter Chatton e Guglielmo di Ockham in merito alle teorie sulla natura cognitiva degli enunciati profetici, un argomento centrale nel dibattito teologico della prima metà del XIV secolo. A partire dalle recenti interpretazioni delle teorie cognitive di Chatton e Ockham alla luce della distinzione epistemica tra esternalismo ed internalismo (e a partire da alcune fonti dove il tema della profezia è cruciale, come la Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 28-29 e i Quodibela 26-29 di Chatton e il Tractatus de praedestinatione et de prescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium di Ockham, la nostra analisi applicherà la distinzione internalismo/esternalismo al caso degli enunciati profetici. A partire dalle questioni epistemologiche che riguardano profezie, futuri contingenti e prescienza divina, l'analisi cercherà di mostrare i principi strutturali e le ricadute pragmatiche di questi enunciati nei due modelli analizzati.
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Relatywizm w kwestii zdań dotyczących przygodnej przyszłości
Relativism about future contingents
Autorzy:
Węgrecki, Jakub
Opis:
In 2003 J. MacFarlane published his "Future Contingents and Relative Truth" essay which won The Philosophical Quarterly Essay Prize. In this paper, MacFarlane presented the theory of assessment relativism.In the first part of my dissertation, I present two theories: The Thin Red Line Theory and The Supervaluationist Theory. The second part introduces the theory of assessment relativism. Finally, I analyze MacFarlane’s arguments for supporitng assessment relativism.
MacFarlane w 2003 opublikował esej pt. „Future Contingents and Relative Truth”, zaktóry dostał nagrodę czasopisma Philosophical Quarterly. Zaprezentował w tym artykulestanowisko nazywane relatywizmem oceny.Pierwsza część pracy poświecona jest zaprezentowaniu dwóch stanowisk - stanowiskacienkiej czerwonej lini oraz superwaluacjonizmu. W drugiej części zostaje wprowadzonymodel relatywizmu oceny, najpierw w formule, w której wprowadził go MacFarlane w 2003roku, a potem w lekko zmodyfikowanej wersji z 2008 roku. Analizie zostają poddane takżeargumenty MacFarlane za przyjęciem relatywizmu oceny.
Dostawca treści:
Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Inne
Tytuł:
Ockhamism without Molinism
Autorzy:
Wawer, Jacek
Wydawca:
Springer
Opis:
According to Ockhamism, some (but not all) future contingents are true. It turns out that a simple-minded representation of Ockhamism within the framework of branching time is highly problematic as it gives no interpretation of the future tense operator in non-actual circumstances. To repair this defect some theorists turned to Molinism - a theory that allows true counterfactual future contingents (e.g., conditionals of freedom). I explain that one can address the formal problems of Ockhamism without resorting to Molinism. Then, I argue that Molinism is indeed a strengthening of Ockhamism and that one could subscribe to the latter without endorsing the former. To this effect, I present a semantic framework which treats the future tense operator and counterfactuals independently and allows a variety of theories regarding actual and counterfactual future contingents, including Ockhamism without Molinism.
Według Okhamizmu pewne (lecz nie wszystkie) zdania o przygodnej przyszłości są prawdziwe. Okazuje się, że pewna naturalna reprezentacja Okhamizmu w ramach modelu branching-time jest wadliwa, gdyż nie pozwala interpretować zdań w czasie przyszłym w nie-aktualnych okolicznościach. Aby przezwyciężyć ten defekt, część teoretyków zwróciła się ku Molinizmowi - teorii, która dopuszcza prawdziwe przygodne kontrfaktyczne okresy warunkowe. Wykazuję, że można przezwyciężyć problemu Okhamizmu bez przyjmowania Molinizmu. Następnie argumentuję, że Molinizm jest istotnym wzmocnieniem Okhamizmu i że można przyjąć drugi z tych poglądów, odrzucając pierwszy. W tym celu wprowadzam formalny model, w który zdania w czasie przyszłym są interpretowane niezależnie od okresów kontrfaktycznych, który pozwala na wysłowienie różnorakich teorii faktycznych i kontrfaktycznych przewidywań - w tym Okhamizmu bez Molinizmu.
Dostawca treści:
Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Twardowski i przygodna przyszłość. Prawdopodobieństwo kontra Cienka Czerwona Linia
Kazimierz Twardowski and Future Contingents: Probability vs the Thin Red Line Theory
Autorzy:
Węgrecki, Jakub
Tematy:
Kazimierz Twardowski
Thin Red Line
future contingents
probability
propositions
Branching-Time
Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2142962.pdf  Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:
One of the most widely discussed philosophical issues is the problem of future contingents. Basically, the challenge is to create an adequate semantic theory of future-tensed sentences. Twardowski (1900) suggests that future contingent statements should be analyzed using the concept of probability.The aim of this paper is to show that (1) such an analysis is not appropriate and (2) that Twardowski’s main theses imply the Thin Red Line Theory. I discuss three potential arguments against my proposal and sketch the connection with Schaffer’s Parallelism Thesis (2012).
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 21

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