Temat: first-person reference

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Milan Kundera on the Uniqueness of One’s Self
Autorzy:: Hart, James G.
Tematy:: self
person
first-person reference
individuality
world
fiction
face
love; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451409.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Here is a philosophical examination of some themes presented by Milan Kundera in The Art of the Novel, as well as in his novels Immortality and The Unbearable Lightness of Being. The discussions of the first-personal perspectives of the novel’s author, both as appearing in and as contrasted with that of a character in the novel, as these unfold in implicit subtle comic, social-political contexts, prescind from these contexts and dwell instead on fictional renditions of the senses of personhood and its individuality especially as embodied in the face and as implied in relations of love. Of special interest is Kundera’s thesis that the irreplaceable uniqueness of the individual is one of Europe’s finest illusions.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

na półce

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: The Transcendental-Phenomenological Ontology of Persons and the Singularity of Love
Autorzy:: Hart, James G.
Tematy:: husserl
sokolowski
klawonn
first-person reference
substance
individuation
eidos
love
immortality; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/985693.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Reference to persons with personal pronouns raises the issue of the primary referent and its nature. “I” does not refer to a property or cluster of properties. This contrasts with our identifying grasp of persons. A person is a radical singularity and thus stands in contrast to a kind or sortal term. The individuation of persons is not adequately grasped by “definite descriptions” or “eidetic singularities.” In spite of the seeming possibility of persons being wholly identical in terms of properties, in other words, “doubles,” the core referent of reference to persons is not to what is individuated merely by mere numerical differences or spatial-temporal, and essential-eidetic determinations. Rather we have to do with a “non-sortal unique essence.” What “I” refers to is a self-individuating substance. This raises questions for the proper referent of “love.” What is it that love intends or loves if persons are basically radical singularities. What does one love and why does one love if whom one loves is most essentially non-sortal? The question of the ontological status of persons requires integrating the status of being transcendental I’s, and thus being non-temporal, non-spatial, non-sortal, simple (non-composite) substances and thus not homogenous with the experienced world.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

na półce

Informacja

Wyszukujesz frazę "first-person reference" wg kryterium: Temat