Temat: game theory - Prolib Integro

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Some Problems With Judging Rationality
Autorzy:: Swistak, Piotr
Tematy:: Game Theory
rationality
behavioral game theory
ultimatum game; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/494300.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Dlaczego w dylemat więźnia warto grać kwantowo?
Why is it Worth Playing Quantum Prisoners Dilemma?
Autorzy:: Szopa, Marek
Tematy:: Teoria gier
Game theory; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Katowicach
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/589703.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: The Prisoner's Dilemma [PD] is the best known example of a two-person, simultaneous game, for which the Nash equilibrium is far from Pareto-optimal solutions. In this paper we define a quantum PD, for which player's strategies are defined as rotations of the SU(2) group, parameterized by three angles. Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the wave function. Classic PD is a particular case of the quantum game for which the set of rotations is limited to one dimension. Each quantum strategy can be, by appropriate choice of counter-strategy, interpreted as a "cooperation" or "defection". Quantum PD has Nash equilibria that are more favorable than the classic PD and close to the Pareto optimal solutions. With proper selection of strategies, quantum PD can be reduced to the classic, zero-sum, "matching pennies" game. In this paper we show examples of economic phenomena (price collusion, the chess strategy) that mimics the Nash equilibria of quantum PD.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Niektóre ontologiczne rozstrzygnięcia Teorii Gier na przykładzie Dylematu Podróżnika i Dylematu Więźnia
Some ontological solutions of Game Theory on example of Traveller's Dilemma and Prisoner's Dilemma
Autorzy:: Jacko, Jan Franciszek
Dostawca treści:: Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: The conventional approach to strategy in solving problems of coordination
Konwencjonalne ujęcie strategii w rozstrzyganiu problemów koordynacyjnych
Autorzy:: Adamus, Magdalena
Opis:: This article show how communication through language can be expressed in terms of game theory. The general idea and the main line of argumentation is based on David Lewis’ book Convention (Lewis 1969) and more recent works on game theory that develop the concepts of cooperation and equilibrium. The term agreement, in the sense given to it by game theory, is used to show how to justify the thesis of the conventional nature of language. In the first part of the article some general notions of game theory are presented. Game theory is supposed to examine strategies chosen by rational agents in order to obtain preferred outcomes and is thus a good tool for describing and predicting human behaviour. It applies to situations when subjects operate reasonably, taking into account the behaviour of other rational subjects, and thus can also be used in situa- tions of language communication. Sustaining conventionalism with game theory is possible primarily because it satisfies two basic conditions: it is both a description and a justification. Only within a complex system is it possible to explain the normative character of language, which, like utility, is only a simplified scheme. Through the analysis of coordination problems and the use of the principles of rationality and utility, it is possible to anticipate the behaviour of agents. In this context normativeness should be regarded as striving for balance, and even if another way of understanding is a deviation of the system, it still can be explored and explained within it.
Dostawca treści:: Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: The difficult beginnings of game theory: Zermelo and Steinhaus : a comparative analysis of early research on solutions to mathematical game problems
Trudne początki teorii gier: Zermelo i Steinhaus : analiza porównawcza pierwszych badań z zakresu rozwiązywania problemów matematycznych o postaci gier
Autorzy:: Adamus, Magdalena
Opis:: This article presents the first problems that were analyzed in a manner that would a few years later be embraced by the expression game theory. Both texts are earlier than the book of Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann, but in my opinion both should be considered as fundamental and inspiring sources of the framework of the game analysis. The article of the Polish mathematician, Hugo Steinhaus, was almost unknown until the late sixties, due to the language it had been written in, and it still remains generally unknown even in Poland. I make an effort to show similarities of intellectual climate in Lwów as well as in other scientific centres, as well as to draw attention to Polish successes in an area that at the time was only an idea, not a ready and finished concept.
Dostawca treści:: Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

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Skocz do pozycji: 6.

Tytuł:: An Energy-Efficient Proactive Routing Scheme for MANET : Game Theoretical Approach of Forwarding with Selfish Nodes
Autorzy:: Sahnoun, A.
Habbani, A.
El Abbadi, J.
Tematy:: game theory
MANETs
energy efficiency; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Czytelnia Czasopism PAN
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/963872.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, nodes exchange packets with each other using intermediate nodes as relays. Since nodes in MANETs are battery powered, energy conservation is a crucial issue. Accepting relay all request may not be in the best interest of a node. But if many nodes prefer not to consume energy in relaying packets on behalf of others, the overall performance of routing in network will be influenced. In this paper we address the energyefficient routing problem in MANETs with selfish nodes. We modeled this problem as a game-theoretic constraint optimization; we defined the utility of each node as a weighted difference between a performance metric and some transmission costs. A motivate mechanism is proposed in order to induce nodes to forwarding cooperation. Each node independently implements the optimal equilibrium strategy under the given constraints. Simulation results by NS3 simulator show that our proposed approach can improve system performance in network lifetime and packet delivery ratio.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 7.

Tytuł:: On ”Games and Dynamic Games” by A. Haurie, J.B. Krawczyk and G. Zaccour
Autorzy:: Więcek, Piotr
Tematy:: game theory, dynamic games, equilibrium; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/748451.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Although the title, ''Games and Dynamic Games" of the new book by Alain Haurie, Jacek B. Krawczyk and Georges Zaccour suggests just another textbook on general game theory, with a little more stress made on dynamic aspect of games, the book appears to be something of novelty both in the scope and the treatment of the material. From the very first chapters of the book, it is clear that we will not be given another standard course of game theory, and that the dynamics of games will be the main issue. It starts with the simplest treatment of game dynamics, which is the extensive form of the game, and, having defined and explained the basic notions of static game theory, progresses to more complex dynamic models. Those start with deterministic repeated games, continue with variable state discrete time (or multistage) dynamic games and deterministic differential (that is, continuous time) games, and finish with stochastic models extending the ones presented before. Each part presents in a self-contained and comprehensive way, the main notions and solution concepts (such as open- and closed-loop strategies, Nash and correlated equilibria, subgame-perfectness, using threats to improve the performance of the equilibrium strategies) and theoretical results. It complements them with a number of economic applications, presented in detail. These applications relate to many fields of interest of economists, such as exploitation of renewable resources, environmental and energy issues, macroeconomics and finance. Each chapter ends with a set of excercices and a {\it game engineering} part, where a detailed presentation of a real-life application of some relevant game model is presented. Just this part is a novelty in the game-theoretic literature, as it shows to what extent the game-theoretic models can be applicable. Although the book presents the mathematical tools to model the situations of conflict in a rather rigorous way, it is clear that its target reader is someone with a background in economics or managemant science rather than mathematics. All the basic mathematical concepts used in the book are carefully explained, with those more complex ones (which appear in the latter chapters of the book) approached mainly through examples and intuitions. I believe this is a good decision of the authors, as in that way it makes the book really accessible to its potential readers. In fact, even though the tools (even those most advanced) of dynamic game theory have now been for many years used to model the economic interactions, surprisingly there has not been a single textbook addressed to more advanced students and researchers in economics and management science, presenting the state-of-art in the theory and applications of dynamic games in a comprehensive way. Those already existing required mathematical expertise well beyond what one could expect from typical economics/management students, and could not serve as textbooks for this type of readers. Moreover, those existing books concentrated without exception on some particular classes of dynamic games (such as differential games and their subclasses, stochastic games, repeated games). The book of Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour fills well the existing gap.Another important advantage of the book is its stress made not only on theoretical concepts and their adoption in real-life models, but on computation issues. The authors present a host of techniques to compute the solutions to the considered games either symbolically or numerically. They also provide information about software that can be used to solve similar games. Also the examples presented in game engineering sections are not abstract. They are based on real data, and issues of the credibility of the solutions obtained is discussed.The clarity of the exposition of often complicated topics is in general a big advantage of the book, although in latter chapters this clarity is sometimes unfortunatelly lost. The best example is the part about games over event trees with a confusing introduction concerning game with finite action sets and then the whole chapter concerning games with continuous ones. Also the last chapter, about stochastic-diffusion games, seems not very well conceived, as it jumps forth and back between an example and some more general considerations, leaving the reader confused about the generality of what is presented. These are certainly minor problems, but unfortunatelly there are other, more upseting issues. In general, it seems that the manuscript was not proofread carefully enough. The number of typos is enormous (the errata added to the book enumerates just a small fraction). Also some other faults, such as references to the colors on one of the figures, which is in black and white (p. 187), self-contradicting sentences like ''We use $\beta$ for a discount factor because we use $\beta$ to denote a strategy'' (p. 233), faults in references between chapters of the book (p. 372, footnote on p. 419) could have been easily eliminated if the book was properly proofread. What is worse though, is that there are also some more serious mistakes: one of the assumptions of the Kakutani fixed point theorem is missing, $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in Lemma 10.1 should be $A\epsilon$-equilibrium. And finally---it seems that most of the section 11.6.1 is missing from the manuscript. This significantly reduces the value of the book. Nevertheless, although I believe that all these errors should make the reader more cautious when reading the book, they do not unmake its main quality, which is acquainting all those interested in describing some real-life multi-agent economic situations in a rigorous way with the theory which provides the tools for doing it.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 8.

Tytuł:: Economic analysis of implementing VMI model using game theory
Autorzy:: Stehel, Vojtěch
Vochozka, Marek
Kliestik, Tomas
Bakes, Vladimir
Tematy:: VMI
game theory
sensitivity analysis; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Instytut Badań Gospodarczych
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/19090921.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Research background: The article deals with implementing VMI between the supplier and customer. To assess whether the system will be implemented, the evolution game theory is used. The contribution is based on the limitations of the study of the evolutionary game theory approach to modelling VMI policies (Torres et al., 2014) and its later extension, The evolutionary game theory approach to modelling VMI policies (Torres & García-Díaz, 2018). It aims is to complement the studies and provide a comprehensive picture of the issue. Purpose of the article: The main objective of the contribution is to respond to the question whether the VMI system will be introduced between the supplier and customer. Methods: In the first phase, the matrix is analysed from the point of view of the game meaning and its limit parameters. The limit parameters are set taking into account the economic reality. The only examined states of the matrix are those where the result is not obvious. For the purposes of the contribution, we work with a 5-year period. A new software capable of calculating evolutionary focus and their stability is created. Sensitivity analysis is carried out for the individual parameters that affect the system behaviour. Findings & Value added: Value added is a complex description of the system and complementation of previous studies in this field. VMI is confirmed. The results obtained can be used for practical management, so that the managers are able to identify what the actual costs are and what the probability of introducing the system is. At the same time, they can identify the parameters that can be influenced by them and observe their impact on the shift of the system introduction probability.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 9.

Tytuł:: Designing Auctions: A Historical Perspective
Autorzy:: Karpowicz, M.
Tematy:: auctions
game theory
mechanism design; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Instytut Łączności - Państwowy Instytut Badawczy
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/307899.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: Auction is a form of organization of competition that leads to the assignment and valuation of resources based on the information obtained from the competing agents. From the perspective of systems science it is a distributed resource allocation algorithm applied in the environment with information asymmetry, i.e., where the interconnected and interacting subsystems have different information about the system as a whole. This paper presents an overview of the historical development of mathematical theory underlying modern approach to auction design. Selected practical applications of the theory are also discussed.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 10.

Tytuł:: On the Nash equilibria of a simple discounted duel
Autorzy:: Kehagias, Athanasios
Tematy:: game theory
Nash equilibrium
duel; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/58969807.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: We formulate and study a two-player – duel – game as a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game. Players P1, andP2 are standing in place and, in each turn, one or both may shoot at the other player. If Pn shoots at Pm (m ̸= n), either he hits and kills him (with probability pn) or he misses him and Pm is unaffected (with probability 1 − pn). The process continues until at least one player dies; if nobody ever dies, the game lasts an infinite number of turns. Each player receives a unit payoff for each turn in which he remains alive; no payoff is assigned to killing the opponent. We show that the always-shooting strategy is a NE but, in addition, the game also possesses so-called cooperative (i.e., non-shooting) Nash equilibria in both stationary and nonstationary strategies. A certain similarity to the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is also noted and discussed.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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