Temat: power indices - Prolib Integro

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: On Public Values and Power Indices
Autorzy:: Bertini, C.
Stach, I.
Tematy:: cooperative game theory
simple game
values
public values
power indices
public power indices; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie. Wydawnictwo AGH
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/375888.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a different point of view that are well-defined in the social context where the goods are public. In particular, we consider the Public Good index (Holler, 1982), the Public Good value (Holler and Li, 1995), the Public Help index (Bertini et al., 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) also called the Zipke index (Nevison et al., 1978), and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper are: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to introduce a new power index with its extension to a game value; and to provide some characterizations of the new index and values.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: On Axiomatization of Plurality Decisions with Veto
O aksjomatyzacji decyzji większościowych z wetem
Autorzy:: Mercik, Jacek
Tematy:: aggregation of preferences
axioms
power indices; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet WSB Merito we Wrocławiu
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/57257411.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: W artykule przedstawiono analizę aksjomatów związanych z większościową metodą agregacji preferencji indywidualnych zarówno wtedy, kiedy konieczny jest wybór jednego z wielu wariantów jak i wtedy, kiedy konieczne jest zaaprobowanie danego pojedynczego wariantu. Rozpatrzono także wpływ na podawane aksjomaty wprowadzenie nowego atrybutu jakim jest prawo weta (bezwzględnego jak i względnego). W konkluzji podkreślono, że stosowana powszechnie metoda agregacji, tj. metoda większościowa nie jest w tym sensie metodą najlepszą.
The article presents an analysis of the axioms associated with the plurality method of aggregation of individual preferences, both when it is necessary to select one of many alternatives and when it is necessary to approve a single alternative. Also, we investigate the impact of the introduction of a new attribute, being the right of veto (absolute and relative), on the axioms given. In the conclusion, the emphasis is that the commonly used method of aggregation, i.e. the plurality method is not, in this sense, the best method.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Indirect control and power
Autorzy:: Bertini, C.
Mercik, J.
Stach, I.
Tematy:: game theory
indirect control
corporations
power indices; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/406544.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: To determine who has the power within a stock corporate company can be a quite complex prob-lem, especially when control is achieved through alliances between shareholders. This problem arises especially in cases of indirect control of corporations, that is, in situations involving shareholders and companies with cross-shareholdings. The first to solve the problem of measuring power in the case of indirect share control were Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen in [10]. In the following years, numerous other models were introduced. In this paper, we critically examine the models of: Gambarelli and Owen, Denti and Prati, Crama and Leruth, Karos and Peters, as well as Mercik and Lobos, taking into account two well-known, illustrative examples, one with an acyclic corporate structure and the other with a cyclic structure.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 4.

Tytuł:: Measurement of control power in corporate networks
Autorzy:: Stach, Izabella
Mercik, Jacek
Tematy:: corporate networks
indirect control
simple games
power indices; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2099514.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods for measuring indirect control in complex corporate shareholding networks. The methods use power indices to estimate the direct and indirect control in shareholding structures. Some of these methods only estimate the control power of investors (firms without shareholdings), and only a few measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks (which means investors and stock companies). None of them takes measuring the importance of mutual connections (edges in the networks) into consideration; thus we focus in particular on an extension of these methods in this paper to measure both the control-power of the firms involved in complex shareholding structures (represented by nodes in networks) and the importance (power) of linkages between the firms as elements of a whole corporate shareholding network. More precisely, we apply our approaches to a theoretical example of a corporate network. Moreover, we continue the considerations about reasonable properties for indirect control measurement. Some ideas of new properties are proposed. The paper also provides a brief review of the literature concerning the topic.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 5.

Tytuł:: National and ideological influence in the European Parliament
Autorzy:: Turnovec, F.
Mercik, J. W.
Mazurkiewicz, M.
Tematy:: a priori voting power
European Parliament
European political parties
power indices
Shapley-Shubik power index; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Badań Systemowych PAN
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/970600.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In this paper we address the following question: Taking as decisional units national chapters of European political parties, is there a difference between a priori voting power of national groups in the case of "national" coordination of voting and in the case of "partisan" coordination of voting? By coordination of voting we mean two step process: in the first step there is an internal voting in the groups of units (national or partisan), in the second step there is a voting of aggregated groups (European political parties or national representations) in the EP. In both cases the voting has an ideological dimension (elementary unit is a party group), difference is only in dimension of aggregation (European parties versus national representations). Power indices methodology is used to evaluate voting power of national party groups in the cases of partisan and national coordination of voting behaviour.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 6.

Tytuł:: Measuring a Collectivity’s Power to Act in Proper, Simple Voting Games : Why We Should Resist the Readiness to Use the Coleman Index
Autorzy:: Kleinowski, Marcin
Tematy:: the power of a collectivity to act
voting power
power of a voting body
power indices; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2044031.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: James S. Coleman proposed the power of a collectivity to act as a measure of the ease with which the individual interests of one member can be transformed into the collective action of a voting body, or into decisions being undertaken by that body which go against the interests of the voters. It was also to be applied in simple voting games, for which the vote threshold was set at a lower level than the majority of votes. Coleman based his model for determining the power of a collectivity to act on the classical definition of probability. In practice, the index is calculated as a quotient of the number of winning coalitions and of all possible coalitions which can be formed by the players – under the existing voting rule. The central hypothesis of the article has as its premise that in proper, simple nperson voting games the Coleman index does not determine passage probability, but only the probability of drawing a winning coalition from the set of all possible combinations of members of the voting body. A new index has also been proposed which should serve to determine a collectivity’s power to act.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 7.

Tytuł:: Computing power indices for weighted voting games via dynamic programming
Autorzy:: Staudacher, Jochen
Kóczy, László Á.
Stach, Izabella
Filipp, Jan
Kramer, Marcus
Noffke, Till
Olsson, Linuss
Pichler, Jonas
Singer, Tobias
Tematy:: cooperative game theory
power indices
weighted voting games
dynamic programming
minimal winning coalitions; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2099634.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games using the paradigm of dynamic programming. We survey the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices and point out how these approaches carry over to related power indices. Within a unified framework, we present new efficient algorithms for the Public Good index and a recently proposed power index based on minimal winning coalitions of the smallest size, as well as a very first method for computing the Johnston indices for weighted voting games efficiently. We introduce a software package providing fast C++ implementations of all the power indices mentioned in this article, discuss computing times, as well as storage requirements.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 8.

Tytuł:: From a toy model to the double square root voting system
Autorzy:: Słomczyński, Wojciech
Życzkowski, Karol
Dostawca treści:: Repozytorium Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

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Skocz do pozycji: 9.

Tytuł:: Elephant in the Room: How to Assess the Vote-weighting System in the Council of the EU
Autorzy:: Kleinowski, Marcin
Tematy:: voting power
Council of the European Union
EU institutional reform
QMV
weighted voting
power indices
blocking coalition; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. Wydawnictwo UMK
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/59149171.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: The article emphasises the complementarity of research based on voting power theory with the analysis of the structure of blocking. Combining both methods enables a more comprehensive assessment of the vote weighting system in the Council of the EU, in particular the impact of changes in the voting system on the position of individual Member States and the power balance in this institution. I make two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, the study develops a non-random voting model, dedicated to QMV in the Council, which abandons the assumption that each coalition of players is equally likely and takes into account the role of the European Commission as an agenda-setter. This not only allows us to exclude many coalitions that are only theoretically possible, but also to analyse the blocking structure from the perspective of different states or coalitions in the Council. Secondly, it shows that the application of blocking structure analysis provides novel insights into the Council’s voting system. Unlike the a priori voting power approach, such analysis does not focus on distribution of winning power in the Council, but on the Member States’ ability to build minimal blocking coalitions. Hence, it complements the application of mathematical indices of voting power in the assessment of the voting system in this institution.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 10.

Tytuł:: Indirect Control of Corporations: Analysis and Simulations
Autorzy:: Stach, I.
Tematy:: corporate shareholding analysis
cooperative game theory
direct and indirect control
financial and economic modeling
power indices; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanisława Staszica w Krakowie. Wydawnictwo AGH
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/375977.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: This paper is devoted to the concept of indirect control in corporate shareholding networks. This topic is important in financial economics. Since shareholding size does not actually reflect an investor’s power-control in corporate shareholding networks, diverse approaches to measuring the control-power of investors has been proposed. We focus in particular on a game-theoretical approach; specifically the model of Denti and Prati (2001) and its implementation to control sharing analysis and simulation in shareholding networks thanks to the computer program „Control Sharing Simulation”.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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