Temat: stopowania - Prolib Integro

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Electrospark alloying process with respect to the measurement of electrical quantities
Proces stopowania elektroiskrowego w aspekcie pomiarów wielkości elektrycznych
Autorzy:: Antoszewski, B.
Kapłon, A.
Rolek, J.
Tematy:: proces stopowania elektroiskrowego
pomiary wielkości elektrycznych
electrospark alloying process
measurement of electrical quantities; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Stowarzyszenie Inżynierów i Techników Mechaników Polskich
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/151976.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: The work is concerned with a physical model of the electrospark alloying process. It discusses the complexity of measurement of electrical quantities describing an electrospark discharge. The aim of the investigation is to determine the relationship between pulse energy and the amount of a deposit constituting a coating.
W opracowaniu na tle modelu fizycznego procesu stopowania elektroiskrowego przedstawiono złożoność problemów pomiarowych wielkości elektrycznych opisujących wyładowanie elektroiskrowe. Celem tych badań jest w dalszej perspektywie określenie relacji pomiędzy energią impulsu a masą materiału tworzącą powłokę.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
Gra o typie wyboru partnera z kontinuum graczy, preferencjami homotypowymi oraz czasem ciągłym
Autorzy:: Ramsey, David Mark
Tematy:: dynamic game
nash equilibrium
stopping problem
partnership formation
tworzenie partnerstwa
gra dynamiczne
równowaga nasha
problem
stopowania; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953347.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: A model of partnership formation is considered in which there are two classes of player (called male and female). There is a continuum of players and two types of both sexes. These two types can be interpreted, e.g. as two subspecies, and each searcher prefers to pair with an individual of the same type. Players begin searching at time zero and search until they find a mutually acceptable prospective partner or the mating season ends. When a pair is formed, both individuals leave the pool of searchers. Hence, the proportion of players still searching and the distribution of types changes over time. Prospective partners are found at a rate which is non- decreasing the proportion of players still searching. Nash equilibria are derived which satisfy the following optimality criterion: each searcher accepts a prospective partner if and only if the reward from such a partnership is greater or equal to the expected reward obtained from future search. So called ”completely symmetric” versions of this game are considered, where the two types of player are equally frequent. A unique Nash equilibrium exists regardless of the precise rule determining the rate at which prospective partners are found. Two examples are given.
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Common-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network Game
Mądrość zespołowa a równowaga bayesowska w grach sieciowych
Autorzy:: Matsuhisa, Takashi
Tematy:: bayesian routing game
common-knowledge
conjecture
expected delay equilibrium
expected price of anarchy
information partition
nash
equilibrium
rational expectations equilibrium
social costs
tworzenie partnerstwa
gra dynamiczne
równowaga nash
problem
stopowania; Pokaż więcej
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/953385.pdf Link otwiera się w nowym oknie
Opis:: In this paper we investigate equilibriums in the Bayesian routing problem of the network game introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999).We treat epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium of social costs function in the network game. It highlights the role of common-knowledge on the users' individual conjectures on the others' selections of channels in the network game. Especially two notions of equilibria are presented in the Bayesian extension of the network game; expected delay equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium. The former equilibrium is given such as each user minimizes own expectations of delay, and the latter is given as he/she maximizes own expectations of a social costs. We show that the equilibria have the properties: If all users commonly know them, then the former equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium in the based KP-model and the latter equilibrium yields a Nash equilibrium for social costs in the network game. Further we introduce the extended notions of price of anarchy in the Bayesian network game for rational expectations equilibriums for social costs, named the expected price of anarchy and the common-knowledge price of anarchy. We will examine the relationship among the two extended price of anarchy and the classical notion of price of anarchy introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou(1999).
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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